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Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation
Heidi Mandanis Schooner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suitable regulation of large, systemically important financial
institutions remains an elusive goal since the Financial Crisis of 2008.
While the United States was quick to respond to the Crisis with the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act 1 (“Dodd-Frank”), that legislation remains controversial.
On the one hand, Congress has given serious consideration to new
legislative proposals that would shorten Dodd-Frank’s reach. 2 On the
other hand, Democratic presidential candidates spar over whether
Dodd-Frank is a good law in need of tweaking or is a weak law
requiring significant overhaul. 3
In the midst of the continuing debate stands the regulation of
banks’ capital. Capital regulation—which constrains the amount of a
bank’s debt in relation to its equity—has emerged as the centerpiece of
modern regulation. While significant debate exists over the appropriate
levels of required capital, consensus opinion supports this form of
regulation as an appropriate and necessary response to financial crises.
More capital and less debt makes banks more resilient and better able
to withstand inevitable economic crises. Naturally, the devil is in the
details, and the debate regarding capital regulation largely boils down to
the question of how much capital is enough, or, on the flip side, how
much debt is too much.
Proponents of higher capital requirements claim that the regulation
* Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. I am grateful to
the Washburn Law Journal for its invitation to give the Fall 2015 Foulston Siefkin Lecture, on which
this Article is based. I thank the Washburn Law School faculty and students for their comments and
Foulston Siefkin LLP for their support. My thanks to Dan Awrey, Anna Gelpern, Julie Hill, Saule
Omarova, Pat McCoy, and Art Wilmarth for comments and encouragement on earlier drafts.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 134 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. See, e.g., The Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, S. 1484, 114th Cong. (2015),
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/key-issues
[https://perma.cc/Q5RE-5KUT]
(proposing, among other things, the elimination of the automatic designation of certain bank holding
companies as systemically important financial institutions).
3. Laura Meckler, Ryan Tracy & Andrew Ackerman, Clinton, Sanders Offer Contrasting
WALL
ST.
J.,
Jan.
15,
2016,
Approaches
to
Wall
Street
Regulation,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sanders-clinton-offer-contrasting-approaches-to-wall-street-regulation1452887307 [https://perma.cc/68EB-4BQK].

327

SCHOONER CORRECT (DO NOT DELETE)

Washburn Law Journal

328

5/2/2016 12:19 PM

[Vol. 55

of capital solves most problems associated with banks’ operations and
that it might even eliminate the need for other types of regulation.
Opponents of higher capital requirements claim such regulations
increase the costs of banks’ operations and therefore restrict the credit
available to the overall economy. Between these extreme views is the
reality that determining the appropriate mix of debt and equity involves
a significant amount of guesswork with regard to how much capital is
necessary to make and keep banks safe. Along with that guesswork
comes a significant risk of error.
Given the obvious benefits of capital, policy makers raised
regulatory capital requirements so that banks are now required to fund
more of their operations with equity than in the years prior to the Crisis.
Yet, many believe that capital rules, in the form of minimum ratios
applied to all banks, are still much too low—asserting that such required
ratios will not provide the necessary solvency protection in the event of
another major crisis. A review of current regulatory practice shows that
bank regulators also treat the current capital ratios as insufficient. Bank
regulators, utilizing their significant discretionary authority, regularly
impose higher capital requirements on individual firms. 4 This practice
demonstrates the reality that current capital ratios are not just
minimum, but bare minimum, ratios. Agency rules set these bare
minimum ratios, but agencies impose higher requirements through
administrative enforcement powers and capital planning related stress
testing. 5 The result is a system of bottom-up regulation with the rules
providing a thin foundation on which the supervisory process builds.
Yet in this bottom-up system, the risk of error in determining
appropriate levels of capital remains at the feet of regulators and,
therefore, ultimately, the public. If it turns out that a very large bank, in
particular, is undercapitalized and fails, losses will be borne by the
public via government subsidies and harm to the overall economy.
The risks associated with determining sufficient capital could be
more sensibly addressed by flipping the current practice from a bottomup to a top-down system of capital regulation. In a top-down system,
capital ratios applicable to all banks would be set high—high enough so
that the risk of undercapitalization is very small. The opposite risk, the
risk associated with requiring excessive capital, would be addressed
through a supervisory process, in which banks could be permitted, on a
firm-by-firm basis, to operate below capital levels set by rule.
The top-down system must go one step further to insulate the
public from the risk of error. Therefore, the top-down system relies on
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Id.
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the well-established premise that bank managers are ultimately
responsible for capital adequacy—appropriate, given their superior
knowledge of their firms’ operations and risk management. Thus, the
top-down system would access that superior knowledge and provide
incentives to avoid error by relying on bank managers to determine
appropriate capital adequate levels.
In this way, if a bank wished to operate at a ratio lower than
required under applicable rules (which now serve as a safe harbor), the
bank’s management could apply to regulators for an exemption from
the rules. Such an application would require management to assure
bank regulators that the bank could operate safely at lower levels of
capital. To create appropriate incentives for a meaningful application
(as opposed to a pro forma statement that lower capital is adequate), an
application would serve as the basis for personal liability (including
appropriate fines and other penalties) against managers if their
assertions regarding capital adequacy proved wrong. Thus, given the
risk of error, the top-down system provides for safer banks and
appropriate loss allocation. Bank managers would be responsible for
error if they seek exemption from capital rules, but may also choose to
enjoy safe harbor protections.
In proposing a top-down system of capital regulation, this Article
shares a precautionary attitude toward bank regulation found
increasingly in post-Financial Crisis scholarship. The viewpoint is one
that favors ex ante financial regulation 6 in which regulators are charged
with avoiding public harm. 7 More broadly, this Article rejects the
notion that regulation is the enemy of markets and therefore must be
minimized. Regulation is viewed neutrally—neither inherently good
nor inherently bad—as a co-existing partner in highly complex and ever
evolving financial markets. 8
6. As discussed infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text, bank supervision, which includes
extensive monitoring of individual firms, is a form of ex ante regulation in that the purpose of such
monitoring is not just to identify violations of law but also to avoid them.
7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty,(Duke
L.Sch.
Pub.
L.
&
Legal
Theory
Ser.
No.
2015-40,
2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2644375
[https://perma.cc/63DM-ZS38]
(discussing the application of a precautionary principle to corporate decisionmaking in systemically
important firms); Hilary Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 173 (1973) (proposing the application of the precautionary approach to financial stability
regulation); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012) [hereinafter Omarova, License to Deal] (proposing a
system of ex ante licensing of complex financial instruments).
8. In the commenting on the post-Financial Crisis reaction to the pre-Financial Crisis blind
belief in markets as the master of risk, Dan Awrey observes: “Just as market fundamentalism has
been found wanting in the wake of the [Global Financial Crisis], so too will any approach to
regulation which favors ideological purity over the rigorous and ongoing evaluation of the market
frictions and market failures that attract regulatory scrutiny and the anticipated costs and benefits of
various forms of regulatory intervention.” Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation
of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 240–41 (2012).
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To develop the case for a top-down system of capital regulation,
this Article continues as follows, Part II describes the normative
foundations of bank regulation—setting the stage for the examination of
the importance of capital regulation. Part III overviews the distinctive
elements of rulemaking and supervision in the bank regulatory regime.
Part IV briefly maps the development of capital regulation and surveys
the current rules and supervision. Part V considers the limitations of
capital regulation, which serve as the foundation for proposals for
significantly higher capital. Finally, Part VI sets forth a proposal in
support of higher capital ratios through the top-down mechanism.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF BANK REGULATION
Long before the terms “too-big-to-fail” (“TBTF”) or “systemically
important” were ever coined, banks—large and small—were subjected
to a system of prudential regulation (also known as “safety and
soundness” regulation). 9 Since the Financial Crisis, two forms of
prudential regulation are often identified—micro-prudential regulation,
and macro-prudential regulation. Micro-prudential regulation seeks to
avoid bank failure, while macro-prudential regulation seeks to limit
risks associated with financial institutions more broadly. 10 Although the
two forms of prudential regulation overlap, this Article primarily
focuses on micro-prudential, asking: how can regulation reduce the
likelihood of individual bank failure? Before entering into a discussion
of any particular mechanism for preserving banks’ safety and soundness
through micro-prudential regulation, it is appropriate to consider the
normative basis for bank regulation. The discussion below groups the
normative basis for bank regulation into three (potentially overlapping)
orientations: functional, market-based, and public interest. 11
A functional account for bank regulation is perhaps the most
traditional. According to this view, the prudential regulation of banks
seeks to protect banks from failure because of their importance to the
overall economy. The so-called “specialness” of banks derives from the
unique services they provide customers in the form of both payments
and liquidity. 12 While banks provide these essential services, they are
9. The first federal bank regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”),
was established in 1863. History: 150 Years of the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/history/index-history.html
[https://perma.cc/RS4F-XQF9].
10. For discussion on the difference between micro and macro prudential regulation, see
MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION,
xvi (2009).
11. Similarly, Professor Omarova identifies three forms of, overlapping, financial regulation:
risk regulation, economic regulation, and social regulation. Omarova, License to Deal, supra note 7,
at 79.
12. For the classic exploration of banks’ special role in the economy, see E. Gerald Corrigan,
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fragile as a result. Banks hold, on the one hand, short-term liabilities
(e.g., bank deposits) and, on the other hand, long-term assets (e.g.,
mortgage loans). In doing so, banks suffer from maturities mismatch,
meaning their liabilities are due in the short term but their assets are
available only in the long term. In addition, as will be discussed in detail
below, banks utilize significant leverage which also serves as an
important source of their fragility. Therefore, these special institutions
are also financially fragile and in need of regulation to protect them
from insolvency.
An economist’s view of the purpose of bank regulation naturally
focuses on banks’ role in a market-based economy. Much like coal-fired
factories, the failure of a bank generates negative externalities or
spillover effects. 13 In other words, when banks fail—particularly the
very large ones—it is not just the banks’ shareholders, creditors, and
employees who suffer. The wider economy suffers when banks fail
because the loss of, for example, payment services causes households
and businesses to suffer. And the decrease in the availability of credit to
the economy can cause or worsen an economic slowdown. Therefore,
an economist would explain that the regulation of banks is necessary to
correct a market failure— the negative externality. 14
A growing number of commentators have moved away from both
the functional description (with its emphasis on the uniqueness of
services banks provide) and the economist’s explanation (which
emphasizes the proper functioning of private markets).
Many
commentators now favor a view of bank regulation that emphasizes the
broad public interest. 15 According to this view, bank regulation is not
an extrinsic force applied to private firms, but is endogenous to special
institutions that are created by governments to serve the public. Much
like utilities, banks operate not primarily to generate profit for their
Annual Report 1982; Are Banks Special?, MINNEAPOLIS FED. RESERVE BANK (1982),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/ar/annual-report-1982-complete-text
[https://perma.cc/YQ3M-SDFK]. Professors Carnell, Macey and Miller observe:
The claim that banks are special thus has a curious dual aspect. On the one hand, it justifies
regulatory interventions uncommon or unknown in other businesses. Few businesses face
such pervasive governmental control. In this respect we could view banks as specially
disfavored because government regulation pervasively limits their freedom of action. On
the other hand, the claim to specialness also justifies regulator favors for banks. Few other
businesses can offer creditor the protection afforded by government deposit insurance.
Few have ready access to a governmental lender of last resort. Few have benefitted so
handsomely from regulatory constraints on competition.
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 57–58 (5th ed. 2013).
13. See generally Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
REGULATION 11 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
14. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 10, at xvii (“We regulate in order to internalize
these externalities”).
15. The public interest view of banking is not new. See, e.g., Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83
(Kan. 1911) (“The public patronage which the banker invites and receives is of such a character that
he becomes in a just sense a trustee of the fiscal affairs of the people and of the state.”).
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shareholders, but rather to provide necessary services to the public. 16
This public interest view takes various shapes. Broadly, banks are seen
as a mechanism through which governments implement ongoing social
policy. 17 More narrowly, banks are seen as fundamentally private
institutions which enjoy legal privileges (such as limited liability) and
government subsidies (like deposit insurance). 18 In exchange for such
privileges, banks must be subjected to regulation to ensure that the
banks’ operations are consistent with the public interest. 19
The normative perspective of bank regulation matters. 20 The
traditional functional view of bank regulation is sustainable only if
banks provide unique services not otherwise available to businesses and
households. 21 The economist’s story of market failure tends to favor
very limited regulation. That is, regulation which only seeks to correct a
measurable market failure, which must be justified under rigorous
cost/benefit type analysis. 22 The public interest justification can support
a less tentative regulatory role because banks are treated as a
16. While he was Kansas City Federal Reserve President, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig labeled banks public utilities and suggested
that they be regulated as such. See Daniel Indiviglio, Should Big Banks Be Regulated as Utilities?,
THE ATLANTIC April 14, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/04/should-bigbanks-be-regulated-as-utilities/237342/ [https://perma.cc/754E-MJX4]. Lord Adair Turner, chair of
the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, made waves when he questioned the “social
usefulness” of investment banking activities. Andrew Ward & Patrick Jenkins, Building Banks a
Branch at a Time, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2cd4d06-1bf611df-a5e1-00144feab49a.html#axzz3z3EbJER6 [https://perma.cc/A64R-ZKGR]; see also John
Cassidy, What Good is Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/29/what-good-is-wall-street
[https://perma.cc/2FMT976M]. Addressing systemically important financial institutions in particular, Professor Steven
Schwarcz argues in favor of expanding managers’ private corporate governance duty to investors to
also include a public corporate governance duty to society. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections:
The Public Governance Duty, 50 GA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections].
17. Hocket and Omarova describe a developmental finance state in which the government
participates actively in financial markets. See generally, Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova,
Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103
(2015). Recognizing the “social contract” between banks and governments, Mehrsa Baradaran
proposes a federally owned bank to serve the needs of lower income individuals. MEHRSA
BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THREAT TO
DEMOCRACY (2015). Allen, supra note 7, at 177.
18. A group of twenty prominent academics argue that regulation should strive to create
healthy banks that provide useful services rather than maximum returns for shareholders and
managers. Anat Admati et al., Heathy Banking System is the Goal, not Profitable Banks, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 9. 2010.
19. Id.
20. See Richard J. Parsons, Warring Ideologies Dash Small Banks’ Hope for Reg Relief,
AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 25, 2015, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/warring-ideologiesdash-small-banks-hopes-for-reg-relief-1076927-1.html [https://perma.cc/A94F-M8ZV] (discussing the
impact of differing ideology on bank regulation).
21. The growth of alternative, non-bank payment system providers could, for example,
undermine this justification. See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82
TEX. L. REV. 681, 683–90 (2004) (discussing the development of unregulated payment systems).
22. See Allen, supra note 7, at 177 (“Unfortunately, because of the difficulties inherent in
providing hard empirical evidence of the benefits of financial stability rules, such rules . . . are
unlikely to be able to withstand the application of a strict cost-benefit analysis standard of review,
and are thus likely to be invalidated if challenged.”)
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government instrumentality inherently subject to significant democratic
control.
III. BANK REGULATION: RULEMAKING AND SUPERVISION
Given the many ways to justify the regulation of banks, it should
come as no surprise that banks are subject to extensive regulation. 23
Here, the term “regulation” is used in its broadest sense to include all
forms of agency control over regulated entities. This includes: (1)
agency rulemaking, an administrative process that involves writing
proscriptive rules that apply to all regulated entities, and (2) agency
supervision, the administrative processes that involve application of
rules to specific firms through bank examination and enforcement. 24
Below is an overview of the regulation of banks, beginning with a
summary of rules that apply to all banks (or large categories of banks)
and then a discussion of the process of firm-specific examination and
enforcement.
Prudential rules traditionally have sought to protect banks from
failure primarily by limiting entry into the banking business and by
restricting banks’ activities. Thus, significant barriers surround the
business of banking in the form of licensing and other entry restrictions.
Banks are subject to a special chartering process which is extensive and
substantive and, therefore, very distinct from the essentially pro forma
process for incorporating other business entities. 25 Bank organizers
must meet fitness standards 26 and must demonstrate knowledge of the
principles of safety and soundness. 27 Perhaps more importantly, once a
bank receives a charter, its activities are restricted. Banks are
prohibited from engaging in commercial (i.e. non-financial) activities. 28
And, even within the financial sphere, banks’ activities are limited. 29
23. Several agencies are responsible for bank regulation at the federal level. The FDIC is the
primary federal regulator for state-chartered, commercial banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”). 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(2) (2012). The OCC is the primary
Id.
federal regulator for nationally-chartered commercial banks and savings institutions.
§ 1813(q)(1). The Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve is the primary regulator for bank
holding companies and state-chartered, commercial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve,
as well as certain non-bank financial companies. Id. §§ 1813(q)(3), 5323(a).
24. For a full discussion of the examination and enforcement process, see RICHARD SCOTT
CARNELL ET AL, supra note 12, at 431–83.
25. For an extensive discussion of the chartering process for banks, see Robert C. Hockett &
Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary?: What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the
Corporation – and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 474–83 (2016).
26. For example, the organizers of a federally chartered bank (called “national” banks) must
demonstrate that they “have the experience, competence, willingness, and ability to be active in
directing the proposed national bank’s affairs in a safe and sound manner.” Organizing a National
Bank or Federal Savings Association, 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(g)(1) (2015).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(h)(6).
28. National banks may engage only in activities related to the “business of banking” as set
forth in the National Bank Act. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2014).
29. Bank holding companies (essentially, a bank’s parent company) are restricted to activities
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For example, the Glass-Steagall Act 30 famously separated commercial
banking from investment banking, and vice versa. 31 More recently,
Congress enacted the Volcker Rule, 32 a provision within Dodd-Frank,
which prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading,
and limits their relationships with hedge funds and private equity
funds. 33 Banks’ permitted activities are heavily regulated as well. For
example, banks are limited in the size of loans they can make to one
borrower. 34 A bank may lend to its officers and directors only in
accordance with specific rules. 35 Banks’ ability to transact with its
affiliates is also regulated. 36
In addition to the regulation of banks’ activities, the overall mix of
banks’ assets and liabilities is also a frequent target of regulation. As
discussed in Part IV, capital regulation has emerged as a centerpiece of
modern bank regulation. Capital regulation limits the extent to which a
bank can fund its activities with debt. The overall purpose of capital
regulation is to limit the risk of insolvency associated with banks that
carry too much debt. Regulations focused on a bank’s sources of funds
take the form of various ratios that impose limits on the bank’s debt.
In addition, banks are often vulnerable to insolvency when they
lack sufficient liquid assets to meet their current obligations. Banks are
particularly vulnerable to this liquidity type of insolvency because many
of their liabilities have short-term maturities (e.g., deposits, repurchase
that are “so closely related to banking.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). The activities of “financial holding
companies” (well managed; well capitalized bank holding companies) are limited to those activities
that are “financial in nature.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1).
30. Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
31. The provisions of Glass-Steagall which prohibited banks from affiliating with securities
firms were repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLB”). Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered
sections in 12 & 15 U.S.C.). GLB did not, however, repeal § 16 of Glass-Steagall which prohibits
national banks from engaging in most underwriting. 12 U.S.C. § 24. GLB also did not repeal § 21 of
Glass-Steagall which prohibits securities firms from taking deposits. 12 U.S.C § 378.
32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619,
124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
33. 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1). The purpose of the Volcker Rule, among other things, is to restrict
banks from engaging in highly profitable and yet highly risky activities while at the same time
enjoying access to the federal safety net. A Senate Report found: “The prohibitions in section 619
therefore will reduce potential taxpayer losses at institutions protected by the federal safety net, and
reduce threats to financial stability, by lowering their exposure to risk.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8
(2010). For a complete discussion of the Volcker covered funds rule, see Erik F. Gerding, Volcker’s

Covered Funds Rule & Trans-Statutory Cross Referenced: Securities Regulation in the Service of
Banking Law, 10 CAP. MARK. L.J. 4, 488 (August 2015). For a discussion of the Volcker proprietary
trading rule, see Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L.

REV. 469 (2013).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 84; 12 C.F.R. § 32.1 (2015). For a general discussion of rules restricting loans to
one borrower, see HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 185–93 (2010).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 375b; 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.1–215.12.
36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1. For a comprehensive discussion of affiliation rules, see Saule T.
Omavora, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011).

SCHOONER CORRECT (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation

5/2/2016 12:19 PM

335

agreements) and many of their assets have long-term maturities (e.g.,
mortgage loans). Liquidity has been traditionally regulated through
mandatory reserve requirements—rules that require banks to hold a
certain percentage of their deposit liabilities (e.g., a rule that allows a
bank to lend out only $90 of every $100 deposit). 37 More recently, bank
regulators have imposed additional liquidity requirements on large and
internationally active banks through a mandatory liquidity coverage
ratio that compares a bank’s high quality liquid assets to its expected
cash demands over a thirty day period. 38
In addition to the extensive rules governing banks’ operations,
banks are subject to an intensive examination and enforcement regime
(collectively referred to as “supervision”). Supervision is distinct from
regulation in that its focus is on individual institutions as opposed to
writing rules that apply to all banks (or large categories of banks). The
foundation of bank supervision is the process of both on-site and off-site
monitoring. Bank regulators monitor a bank’s operations through
periodic reports and on-site examinations. Generally, bank regulators
are required to conduct an annual on-site examination. 39
The process of monitoring can lead to a determination that a bank
has violated a rule. Under such circumstances, bank regulators have
broad power to bring administrative enforcement actions against banks
and bank managers 40 for violating a law or rule, or, more broadly,
engaging in an unsafe and unsound banking practice. 41
The
administrative enforcement powers include: cease and desist powers
(which can include the authority to order restitution, reimbursement or
indemnification), 42 removal from office and prohibition from
participation in the banking industry, 43 and civil money penalties. 44 As
discussed in Part IV, capital requirements often serve as the basis for
administrative enforcement actions.

37. 12 U.S.C. § 461. The Federal Reserve Board sets reserve requirements in its Regulation D,
12 C.F.R. § 204.1–204.10.
38. 12 C.F.R. § 249.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d).
40. Bank officers, directors, employees, and certain shareholders, as well as certain
professionals (under some circumstances) are “institution-affiliated parties” under federal banking
statutes and, therefore, potentially subject to enforcement actions. Id. § 1813(u).
41. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. For a full discussion of the meaning of “unsafe
and unsound banking practices,” see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding
Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
175 (1995). These agencies’ determinations may be appealed to the appropriate United States Court
of Appeals. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1). Banking agencies have the authority to issue a cease and desist
order against a bank and/or its managers for engaging in “an unsafe or unsound practice” or violating
“a law, rule, or regulation, or any condition imposed in any application, notice . . . or any written
agreement entered into with the agency.” Id.
43. Id. § 1818(e)(1).
44. Id. § 1818(i)(2).
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IV. CAPITAL ADEQUACY: THE CORNERSTONE OF BANK REGULATION
As discussed in Part III, banks are subjected to many forms of
regulation. The regulation of capital, however, has emerged as the
cornerstone of modern bank regulation. Most discussions of capital
regulation focus on the agencies’ rules, which set minimum capital
requirements through various financial ratios and, therefore, such
discussions can quickly devolve into a technocratic morass. In an
attempt to illuminate rather than obfuscate, this Part begins with a stark
overview of capital regulation using a typical household, as opposed to
using a bank, as the running example.
With that broad view in mind, this Part moves on to highlight bank
management’s role in capital adequacy and then to discuss the minimum
ratios which form the foundation for capital regulation. Next, this Part
discusses the often ignored supervisory process of examination and
enforcement and the important role it plays in capital regulation.
Finally, this Part concludes with the formulation of an overall picture of
how capital regulation functions through the combination of both rules
and supervision—labeling the system “bottom-up capital regulation.”

A. Captial Regulation: The Big Picture
Capital regulation limits the extent to which a bank can fund its
activities with debt. The capital regulatory regime has become
increasingly complex in the last thirty years. Before diving into
examination of this complex regime, let us consider the fundamental
principles of capital regulation through the application of the same
principles to an individual household.
Consider Sam, a consumer who wants to purchase a home for
$500,000. Sam may enjoy access to various sources to supply the
purchase price for the home, such as: mortgage loans, loans from family
members, savings, gifts, and other liquid investments. Suppose Sam
wishes to finance the entire $500,000 purchase with borrowed money.
Funding the purchase of the home entirely with debt raises a number of
issues. Most importantly, Sam’s bank will not typically be willing to
lend Sam the entire purchase price. Instead, the bank may require Sam
to come up with a “down payment” based on a percentage of the
purchase price. That required down payment operates as a form of
capital regulation.
In this case, Sam’s bank (as opposed to bank regulators as
discussed below), is requiring Sam to finance the acquisition of the
home with some “equity”—non-borrowed funds. Why might the bank
insist on a down payment? First, if Sam finances the purchase entirely
with borrowed money, then Sam may be more likely to walk away from
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the loan obligation if Sam, at some future date, has difficulty making the
monthly payments. Sam might be willing to simply walk away because
Sam has no “stake” (i.e., equity) in the home. If Sam defaults on the
mortgage loan, the bank will foreclose on the home and there will be
nothing left over for Sam from the sale of the house once the bank’s
debt is paid. 45 Second, suppose the value of the house declines.
Nothing much will happen if Sam continues to make the required
monthly loan payments. But, if Sam can no longer make those
payments, then the value of the home no longer matches the value of
the outstanding debt (often referred to as an “underwater mortgage”). 46
This means that unless Sam has additional assets to make up the
difference, Sam is rendered insolvent.
A required down payment provides Sam and the lender with a
cushion against Sam’s insolvency. Had the lender required Sam to
make a down payment of, for example, 5% (in this case, $25,000), then a
decline in the value of the house would not create the financial
instability described above. Sam would be less likely to simply walk
away from the mortgage loan (allowing the bank to foreclose) because
that would mean giving up Sam’s equity. Additionally, Sam would not
face insolvency in the event that the house declined in value. That is, of
course, unless the value of the home declined by more than 5%. 47

B. Capital Regulation: Who is Responsible
Continuing with the example of Sam, it is important to recognize
that even if Sam’s bank allows Sam to purchase a house with a very low
down payment, Sam will be liable if Sam ends up unable to pay the
mortgage payments when they come due. Sam’s bank may be
“regulating” Sam’s ability to fund the home purchase with too much
debt, but Sam is ultimately responsible for those debts. The regulation
of banks’ capital operates in the same way. While the remainder of this
45. Of course, this would not be true if the value of the house had appreciated. So, if the
consumer borrowed $500,000 to purchase a home with a $500,000 purchase price, and now the house
is worth $550,000, then the consumer would not likely be indifferent to the $50,000 gain in equity.
Still, stories about capital regulation are not as important under circumstances in which asset prices
are rising. In such cases, if our consumer was having difficulty paying the mortgage payments, the
consumer could simply sell the house, pay off the mortgage balance, and pocket the equity. Capital
regulation is salient when assets prices are falling.
46. Following the Financial Crisis, ten million mortgaged properties were underwater,
representing approximately one-fifth of all mortgaged properties. JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S
HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME
MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 282 (2014).
47. Note that from the peak in 2006, U.S. housing prices fell by 28%. FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 215 (2011). Thus, the 5% down payment
in this hypothetical would not have done much to save many homeowners from the adverse effects of
falling home prices.
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Part will focus on the role of banking agencies in regulating capital, the

responsibility for maintaining adequate bank capital rests with bank
management.
Bank management’s responsibility for capital adequacy derives not
only from their statutory obligations, but also from corporate
governance policies. 48 Sound corporate governance practices emphasize
the role of managers in ensuring adequate capital. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City highlights this point in its publication “Basics for
Bank Directors”:
As a bank director, you are responsible for making sure your bank’s
capital is adequate for safe and sound operation. Fulfilling this
responsibility entails evaluating and monitoring your bank’s capital
position and planning for its capital needs. 49

Bank managers’ independent responsibility to ensure adequate
levels of capital may explain why banks do not always operate close to
the regulatory minimum and, at times, hold much more capital than
required by regulators. 50

C. Capital Regulation: Rulemaking
In the absence of government support, banks would face the same
obstacles and risks that Sam faced when Sam wished to finance an asset
purchase primarily with debt. The existence of government support sets
banks apart from other borrowers. While all firms borrow money to
fund investments (as opposed to funding those investments with capital
contributions from shareholders or retained earnings), financial
institutions rely much more heavily on debt than other non-financial
firms. 51 Banks are more highly leveraged (i.e., borrow more money)
than other firms because they can borrow money at lower rates than
other firms. 52 Banks’ ability to borrow at low rates derives from the
48. As discussed in Part III, bank officers and directors can be held liable for violations of
statute, regulation or for engaging in unsafe or unsound banking practices.
49. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, BASICS FOR BANK DIRECTORS 24 (5th ed.
2010).
50. See ALLEN BERGER ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, ECONOMIC
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, RWP 08-01, HOW DO LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE
THEIR CAPITAL RATIOS? (Apr. 2008) (finding that large banking organizations during the period of
1992 to 2006 held significantly more equity capital than required by regulators).
51. According to a New York Federal Reserve Bank staff report: “a typical non-financial firm
has equity that exceeds 50% of its assets. By contrast, in mid 2010, the median capital ratio of
commercial banks was about 8.5%.” VIRAL ACHARYA ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW
YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 490, ROBUST CAPITAL REGULATION, 2 (Apr. 2011).
52. See Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 37 J. OF BANKING & FIN., 3830, 3830–42 (2013);
Andreas A. Jobst & Dale F. Gray, Systemic Contingent Claims Analysis—Estimating MarketImplied Systemic Risk, (Washington: International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/54, 2013);
Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pgach Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks, (Washington:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Working Paper No. 2014-02, 2014). If post Financial
Crisis reforms prove successful, however, banks’ funding advantage may decline. See Eric Platt &
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government’s explicit (e.g., deposit insurance) or implicit (e.g., bailouts)
guarantees of their solvency. 53 Banks’ high leverage makes government
bailouts necessary to avoid widespread economic fallout. And, most
infuriatingly, because banks enjoy government support, they can use
cheap borrowed funds to grow their balance sheets even larger, which in
turn, makes government support in a crisis all the more inevitable. In
other words, the TBTF problem feeds on itself. 54 For all of these
reasons, various rules (primarily found in agency regulations as opposed
to statutes) limit the extent to which banks can fund their activities with
debt. The simplest of these, and the focus of this Article, is the leverage
ratio. The leverage ratio (sometimes referred to as the “simple leverage
ratio”) is calculated by dividing a bank’s equity 55 by its assets. 56 The
lower the ratio of equity to assets, the higher the bank’s leverage
because, like in the example involving Sam, the bank has made a lower
down payment on its asset investments. U.S. banks have long been
required under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)
regulations to maintain a ratio of capital (equity) to total assets of 4%. 57
More recently, bank holding companies 58 have also been required to
comply with a leverage ratio of 4%. 59 Again, like in the case of Sam,
this is equivalent to requiring a bank to make a 4% down payment on
the purchase of all of its assets.
The simplicity of the leverage ratio proved attractive in reform
efforts following the Financial Crisis. The international standard setting
body, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 60 (“Basel Committee”)
Ben McLannahan, S&P Downgrades Raft of US Banks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, (credit rating
agency’s downgrade of the eight largest U.S. bank holding companies is seen as evidence of decline in
government support).
53. Acharya et al., supra note 51, at 8. Banks’ preferences for debt represents a deviation from
the Modigliani and Miller model. For further discussion on this point, see SCHOONER & TAYLOR,
supra note 34, at 133–34.
54. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM
LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 103 (April 2014) (“Thus, countries emerged from the
financial crisis with an even bigger problem: many banks were even larger than before and so were
the implicit government guarantees.”).
55. The amount of “equity” is really an accounting fiction which is derived by subtracting total
liabilities from total assets.
56. Specifically, the leverage ratio is derived by dividing Tier 1 capital by total assets. 12 C.F.R.
§ 325.3(b)(1) (2015). Tier 1 capital is essentially made up of common and certain noncumulative
preferred stock with various adjustments. Id. § 325.2.
57. 12 C.F.R. § 325.3(b)(2). Certain highly rated institutions are held to a 3% leverage ratio.
Id. § 325.3(b)(1). But that rule must be balanced against prompt corrective action rules (triggering
certain agency action as bank capital deteriorates), which require an adequately capitalized bank to
have a 4% or greater leverage ratio. Id. § 325.103(b)(2)(iii).
58. A bank holding company is any company which has control over a bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1).
59. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(a)(4) provides that a leverage ratio of 4% applies to a “board-regulated
institution.” 12 C.F.R. § 217.2 defines a “board-regulated institution” to include, among other
institutions, a bank holding company.
60. The Basel Committee was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the G-10
countries. For information on the Basel Committee, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
ABOUT
THE
BASEL
COMMITTEE,
(Sept.
30,
2015),
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added a supplementary leverage ratio 61 to its Basel III reforms. 62 More
demanding than the leverage ratios described above, a supplementary
leverage ratio incorporates both on- and off-balance sheet assets and
requires the ratio of capital to such assets of 3%. 63
Consistent with the Basel III reforms, the United States has
incorporated supplemental leverage ratios since the Financial Crisis.
Bank holding companies with assets equal to or greater than $250 billion
or on-balance sheet foreign exposures equal to $10 billion must comply
with a supplementary leverage ratio of 3%. 64 Consistent with Basel III,
the supplementary leverage ratio includes on-balance sheet and many
off-balance sheet exposures in the calculation of assets. 65 In addition,
going beyond the standards set under Basel III, beginning on January 1,
2018, bank holding companies with assets greater than $700 billion 66
must maintain an enhanced supplementary leverage ratio of 5% to
avoid restrictions on dividends and discretionary bonus payments. 67
Note that more capital is required to meet the supplemental leverage
ratio than the simple (generally-applicable) leverage ratio. 68 As the
notice of final rulemaking explains: “a 5 percent supplementary leverage
ratio corresponds to roughly a 7.2 percent generally applicable leverage
ratio and a 6 percent supplementary leverage ratio corresponds to
roughly an 8.6 percent generally applicable leverage ratio.” 69
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm?m=3%7C14%7C573 [https://perma.cc/49E3-BR3B].
61. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO
FRAMEWORK
AND
DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS,
(January
2014)
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9A6-G2XQ].
62. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (Dec. 2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm [https://perma.cc/XA2Z-BVD7].
63. The addition of off balance sheet assets makes this ratio harder to comply with since assets
are in the denominator of the ratio and, thus, more capital is required in the numerator to meet the
percentage minimum requirement.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(a)(5) (supplementary leverage ratio of 3% applies to “advanced
approaches Board-regulated institutions,” which is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 217.100(b) through 12
C.F.R. § 217.2).
65. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(c)(4).
66. This captures the eight U.S. bank holding companies considered to be “global systemically
important banks.” Specifically, it includes: Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup,
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. Global Capital
Index: Capitalization Ratios for Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs), FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. (Mar. 30, 2015) https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/capitalizationratios4q14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49P9-3QHP].
67. 12 C.F.R. § 217.11(c). In addition, the FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries of such large
institutions must maintain a supplementary leverage ratio of 6% to be considered well capitalized
under prompt corrective action rules. 12 C.F.R. § 324.403.
68. The Federal Reserve explained as follows: “Because total leverage exposure includes offbalance sheet exposures, for any given company with material off-balance sheet exposures, the
minimum amount of capital required to meet the supplementary leverage ratio would substantially
exceed the amount of capital that would be required to meet the generally applicable leverage ratio,
assuming that both ratios were set at the same level.” Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital,
Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their
Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 24528, 24530 (May 1, 2014).
69. Id.
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While the leverage ratio has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years,
other capital ratios were all the rage prior to the Financial Crisis and
continue to be an essential part of the regulatory regime. In fact, prior
to the Financial Crisis, other capital ratios developed in direct reaction
to the limitations of the leverage ratio. The problem with the leverage
ratio is that it does not account for the relative riskiness of banks’ assets.
If a leverage ratio were applied in the opening example above, Sam
would be required to make the same percentage down payment on any
asset purchase, regardless of whether the purchase is the $500,000 home
or a painting to hang over the sofa in that home. By treating all assets
the same, the leverage ratio can encourage banks to hold relatively
more risky assets (because riskier assets have a higher rate of return),
which increases the bank’s risk of insolvency. This limitation of the
leverage ratio was the basis for the Basel Committee’s original capital
accord, which came to be known as Basel I, 70 in which it endorsed a
risk-weighted capital requirement.
Thinking back to the household example, a risk-weighted capital
requirement requires different down payments for different assets: the
riskier the asset, the higher the down payment. Thus, Sam might be
required to come up with a 20% down payment in purchasing a house
(because real estate fluctuates in value) but could purchase a savings
bond (a low risk asset) with no down payment at all, meaning Sam could
make this purchase with all borrowed money.
Under Basel I, capital is compared to risk-weighted assets (this
ratio is generally referred to as the “capital ratio”), and must be greater
than or equal to 8%. With respect to the denominator of the capital
ratio, Basel I has four risk-weighted buckets corresponding to certain
classes of assets (or, four different down payments). For example,
under Basel I, certain loans carry a 20% risk-weight, which means that a
bank must make such a loan with only 80% borrowed funds. 71 With
respect to the numerator of the capital ratio, capital has two
components: core capital and supplementary capital. 72 Core capital
70. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT
AND
CAPITAL
STANDARDS
(July,
1988),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AUL-5CNC].
71. On the other hand, cash assets carry a zero risk weight which, in effect, allows a bank to set
aside no capital against its cash assets. Basel I relies on membership in the Organization for
Economic Development and Cooperation (“OECD”) to determine certain risk weights. For
example, a loan to an OECD bank with a maturity of greater than a year carries a 20% risk weight,
whereas the same loan to a non-OECD bank country carries a 100% risk weight. Residential
mortgages are weighted under Basel 1 at 50%. For further discussion of Basel I capital ratios, see
SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 137–43.
72. In effect, the definition of capital is really about the defining a bank’s liabilities. This is
because capital is calculated by subtracting total assets from total liabilities. In determining what
constitutes total liabilities, a judgment as to the nature of contractual instruments must be made: is
the instrument fundamentally an equity claim entitled to only residual assets or does the instrument
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(Tier 1) comprises, primarily, paid-up capital and reserves.
Supplementary capital (Tier 2) includes, among other things, various
forms of subordinated debt and hybrid debt-equity instruments. Thus,
the capital ratio not only adjusts assets for their risk (the denominator),
but also allows certain types of debt to count as capital (the numerator).
While the Basel I capital ratio was adopted around the world,
including in the United States, its limitations were soon apparent.
Among other things, the four risk-weight buckets were crude
measurements of asset risk. Also, many off-balance sheet exposures
were not reflected in the ratio. These and other criticisms of Basel I led
to Basel II, completed in 2004, 73 which attempted further refinement of
the risk-weighting categories and introduced the use of risk
management tools for regulatory purposes. 74 Basel II retained the same
approach to the definition of capital in the numerator as originally
established under Basel I. Regarding the denominator, Basel II
replaced the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development category approach with risk-weighted categories based on
external credit ratings, often referred to as the standardized approach.
In a more radical departure from Basel I, Basel II also adopted an
alternative internal-ratings based approach which relies on banks’
internal estimates of the key risk elements that determine their required
capital.
Basel II was controversial 75 and was never fully implemented in the
United States before the Financial Crisis. The Basel Committee
responded to the Crisis with various new standards, including the
supplemental leverage ratio discussed above. 76
Also, the Basel
Committee proposed revisions to the risk-weighted capital ratio. Basel
III places a strong emphasis on the sources of capital and raised the
minimum capital requirement significantly. While the ratio of capital to

represent a contractual payment claim.
73. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (June, 2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [https://perma.cc/V495-E4UV].
74. For further discussion of Basel II, see SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 148–82.
75. The Quantitative Impact Studies conducted by the Basel Committee shows that large
internationally active banks would have lower capital requirements under Basel II than under Basel
I. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY 3 – OVERVIEW OF
GLOBAL RESULTS (May 5, 2003), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3results.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR8EUGR6] (the study showed some increases in capital requirements for banks using the standardized
approach).
76. One of the most immediate responses to the Financial Crisis was Basel II.5. Basel II.5 was
designed to discourage exploitation of the designation of bank assets into the banking book versus
the trading book. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II
MARKET
RISK
FRAMEWORK
(July,
2009),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN8C-UVX7]; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES FOR
COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR INCREMENTAL RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK (July, 2009),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs159.pdf. [https://perma.cc/JE9L-4FDH].
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risk-weighted assets remains—as it has been since Basel I—at 8%, the
composition of capital (the numerator) requires much more high quality
capital and core capital. 77 Basel III includes additional capital
requirements in the form of conservation 78 and countercyclical buffers. 79
While a point by point comparison of Basel III and the United States’
implementation thereof is beyond the scope of this Article, the United
States has implemented most of Basel III. 80 Most important to this
Article, recall that, with regard to the supplemental leverage ratio, the
U.S. standard exceeds that set under Basel III. 81
While the risk-weighted capital ratio remains an important element
of capital regulation 82 both at the international level, as reflected in
Basel III, and in U.S. rules, the leverage ratio and supplementary
leverage ratios have attracted special attention. While all leverage
ratios suffer from the fact that assets remain undifferentiated, this fact
remains fundamental to the leverage ratios’ strength. The counterpoint
to the leverage ratio—the risk-based capital ratio—suffers under its own
weight. The attempt to quantify the risk of assets becomes, virtually, an
77. Basel II set common equity (the highest quality capital) to risk-weighted assets at 2% and
Basel III increases that ratio to 4.5%. Basel II set Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets at 4% and
Basel III increases that ratio to 6%. Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager, Bank for
International Settlements, The Basel III Capital Framework: a Decisive Breakthrough (Nov. 22,
2010) at 9, http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101125a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WJG-FJZS].
78. The conservation buffer requires an additional 2.5% of common equity Tier 1 capital to
risk-weighted assets to be built up during good times and available to draw down during times of
stress. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 54–57 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/87F5-F2UN].
79. The countercyclical buffer requires an additional 1% to 2.5% of common equity Tier 1 or
other loss absorbing capital to risk-weighted assets during times of excess aggregate credit growth.
Id. at 57–60. For a full discussion of countercyclical buffers, see Brett H. McDonnell, Designing
Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18 N. C. BANKING INST. 123 (2013).Id.
80. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital
Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Riskweighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches RiskBased Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (October 11, 2013). The
Basel Committee has determined that the U.S. implementation of Basel III is largely consistent,
stating:
Overall, and given the planned adoption and implementation of some amendments
described in this report that the US regulatory agencies agreed to take and proposed
publically, the assessment team finds the risk-based capital requirements in the US to be
largely compliant with the minimum standards agreed under the Basel framework.
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME (RCAP) ASSESSMENT OF BASEL III REGULATIONS – UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5
(Dec., 2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d301.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YB6-KBUW].
81. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.
82. “RWAs are an important part of both the micro- and macro-prudential toolkit, and can (i)
provide a common measure for a bank’s risks; (ii) ensure that capital allocated to assets is
commensurate with the risks; and (iii) potentially highlight where destabilizing asset class bubbles are
arising.” Vanessa Le Leslé & Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-weighted Assets 5 (Int’l Monetary
Fund Working Paper No. 12/90, 2012). Even very recently, the Basel Committee continues to issue
standards regarding the risk weighting of assets. See e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, STANDARDS: MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MARKET RISK (January,
2016) http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d352.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5T7-EVTF] (discussing capital
requirements for trading book assets).
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If risk weights could be assigned that anticipate and calibrate risks with
perfect foresight, adjusted on a daily basis, then perhaps risk-weighted
capital standards would be the preferred method for determining how to
deploy capital. However, they cannot. To believe they can is a fallacy
that puts the entire economic system at risk. 83

The observation of Hoenig and others, 84 along with the observation
that the FDIC’s leverage ratio helped insulate U.S. banks during the
Financial Crisis over their European counterparts, led to the resurgence
of the leverage ratio. Of course, significant guesswork is endemic in the
calculation of all capital ratios. Risk-weighting assets (as Hoenig
describes above), calculating core capital and determining the size of onand off-balance sheet assets, all rely on estimation.

D. Capital Regulation: Supervision
Note that the ratios described above are often referred to as
“minimum” ratios. Institutions that comply with the various ratios are
not necessarily safe or unlikely to fail in a crisis. In fact, experience
suggests that minimum capital ratios are a lagging indicator of a bank’s
financial stability such that declines in capital ratios are typically not
evident until the institution is well on its way to insolvency. 85 Thus, the
firm-specific supervisory process is meant to correct the deficiencies of
the one-size-fits all rule-based regulation. The Federal Reserve Board’s
capital rules explain:
Notwithstanding the minimum requirements in this part, a Boardregulated institution must maintain capital commensurate with the level
and nature of all risks to which the Board-regulated institution is exposed.
The supervisory evaluation of the Board-regulated institution’s capital
adequacy is based on an individual assessment of numerous factors,
including the character and condition of the institution’s assets and its
existing and prospective liabilities and other corporate responsibilities. 86

The supervisory process plays a significant role in the regulation of
banks’ capital. Capital adequacy is a key measure in the supervisory
process; it is listed as the first factor under the supervisory rating system,
83. Thomas Hoenig, Basel III Capital: A Well-Intended Illusion, Remarks to the International
Association of Deposit Insurers 2013 Research Conference in Basel, Switzerland, FED. DEPOSIT INS.

CORP.
(April
9,
2013),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr0913.html
[https://perma.cc/8VUZ-VKGZ].
84. The process of risk-weighting is also undermined by the fact that the same assets are
sometimes assigned different weights. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 82.
85. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, U.S. Bank Resolution Reform: Then and Again, in CROSS
BORDER INSOLVENCY 411 (Oxford, Rosa Lastra, ed., 2011).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(d) (2015). See also 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)(2014) (“Each appropriate
Federal banking agency shall have the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a
banking institution as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deems to be
necessary or appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the banking institution.”).
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CAMELS. 87 Therefore, through the process of bank examination,
regulators can (and do) determine that a particular bank must hold
capital in excess of the minimum capital ratios set in applicable rules.
Such higher levels of capital are imposed, formally, through the
administrative enforcement mechanisms described in Part III, or
informally through negotiation.
Professor Julie Hill conducted a comprehensive empirical study of
all publicly available formal capital enforcement actions between 1993
and 2010, a total of 2,350 actions. 88 Hill’s study found an increase in
capital enforcement actions between 2008 and 2010, which
corresponded with the Financial Crisis. 89 According to Hill’s study,
such enforcement actions most often rely on the leverage ratio as the
mechanism for imposing higher capital. 90 The mean leverage ratio
imposed in such actions was 8%—double the leverage ratio of 4% set
under agency rules. 91 Hill’s study included one bank that was required
to meet a 28% leverage ratio (clearly, as Hill notes, an outlier), but also
twenty-three banks that were required to meet leverage ratios of
between 12% and 17%. 92 In all, Hill’s study found that bank regulators
had imposed a leverage ratio of between 4.5% and 28% through formal
enforcement actions during the period studied. 93 Note that Hill’s study
included only banks—not bank holding companies—and that of the
2,350 enforcement actions studied, only two involved “large” banks. 94
While Hill’s study involved almost exclusively smaller banks, large
bank holding companies are also subject to significant capital
supervision. Large bank holding companies with assets of fifty billion
dollars or more are required by the Federal Reserve to submit an
annual capital plan 95 and are subject to the Federal Reserve’s annual
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) process. The
capital plan is a “written presentation of a bank holding company’s
capital planning strategies and capital adequacy process . . . .” 96 The
Federal Reserve may object to a bank holding company’s capital plan

87. CAMELS is an acronym for the examiners assessment of six key areas: Capital adequacy,
Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk.
88. Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: Am Empirical Study, 87
IND. L.J. 645 (2012).
89. Id. at 672–73.
90. 1,691 of the 2,350 actions imposed an increased leverage ratio. Id. at 679.
91. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (describing the leverage ratio rules for
banks).
92. Hill, supra note 88, at 680.
93. Id. at 681. Hill’s study includes data for enforcement actions that relied on other ratios as
well, including risk-based capital ratios. Id.
94. Hill’s study relied on the FDIC’s classification of the fifty largest banks to serve as the
measure of large banks. Id. at 691.
95. Capital Planning, 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2016).
96. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(c)(3).
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and thereby prohibit the bank holding company from making capital
distributions (i.e., among other things, paying dividends to
shareholders). 97 CCAR is a supervisory process that, among other
things, assesses the capital plan. CCAR is an annual assessment that
complements supervisory stress testing mandated under Dodd-Frank. 98
The Federal Reserve describes CCAR as follows:
The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) is an annual
exercise by the Federal Reserve to assess whether the largest bank
holding companies operating in the United States have sufficient capital
to continue operations throughout times of economic and financial stress
and that they have robust, forward-looking capital-planning processes that
account for their unique risks. 99

The CCAR includes both a qualitative assessment of a bank
holding company’s capital planning process and, more relevant here, a
quantitative assessment of the bank holding company’s ability to
maintain post-stress capital ratios above the applicable minimum ratios
in effect. 100 By testing banks’ regulatory capital under both expected
and stressed (hypothetical) conditions, 101 the CCAR, in effect, results in
higher minimum capital requirements for large bank holding companies.
For example, with regard to the leverage ratio, while the minimum
requirement under the Federal Reserve’s rules is 4%, the CCAR
97. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(2). “Capital distribution” means:
[A] redemption or repurchase of any debt or equity capital instrument, a payment of
common or preferred stock dividends, a payment that may be temporarily or permanently
suspended by the issuer on any instrument that is eligible for inclusion in the numerator of
any minimum regulatory capital ratio and any similar transaction that the Federal Reserve
determines to be in substance a distribution of capital.
12 C.F.R. § 225.8(d)(4).
98. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1) (2012).
99. Stress Tests and Capital Planning, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (June 25,
2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm
[https://perma.cc/LKD9-FU5V]. For further discussion of the Federal Reserve’s supervisory process
regarding bank holding company capital, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND
RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE (Aug. 2013).
100. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS
AND REVIEW 2015: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 9 (Mar. 2015).
101. Stressed conditions are provided both by the Federal Reserve and developed by the bank
holding company itself. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(d)(2)(i)(A). Regarding the development of stressed
conditions, the Federal Reserve explains:
[Bank holding company (“BHC”)] stress scenarios should reflect macroeconomic and
financial conditions that are tailored specifically to stress a BHC’s key vulnerabilities and
idiosyncratic risks, based on factors such as its particular business model, mix of assets and
liabilities, geographic footprint, portfolio characteristics, and revenue drivers. . . .
BHCs with stronger scenario-design practices clearly and creatively tailored their BHC
stress scenarios to their unique business-model features, emphasizing important sources of
risk not captured in the supervisory severely adverse scenario. Examples of such risks
observed in practice included a significant counterparty default; a natural disaster or other
operational-risk event; and a more acute stress on a particular region, industry, and/or asset
class as compared to the stress applied to general macroeconomic conditions in the
supervisory adverse and severely adverse scenarios.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE 17 (Aug., 2013).
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requires, in effect, higher leverage ratios for all thirty-one individual
bank holding companies reviewed. The 2015 CCAR projects a
minimum leverage ratio of between 4.1% to 11% under severely
adverse scenarios and between 4.5% to 11.8% for adverse scenarios. 102

E. Bottom-Up Capital Regulation
Capital regulation becomes a more complex picture when both
rulemaking and supervisory practices are considered together. Using
the simple leverage ratio as the point of reference, the minimum
required ratio is not, in fact, the standard to which many banks or bank
holding companies are held. The supervisory process imposes higher—
in some cases much higher—capital requirements on banks on a caseby-case basis. This happens, as discussed above, either through formal
enforcement actions or, for large bank holding companies, through the
capital planning and CCAR process.
Thus, it becomes clear that bank regulators use their supervisory
discretionary power to impose capital ratios significantly higher than the
standards set by regulation. The result is a system of bottom-up
regulation with the rules providing the foundation on which the
supervisory process builds as illustrated below in Figure 1. The bottomup regulatory regime begins with the leverage ratio of between 3 and
6%, as discussed in Part IV.C, 103 and builds up to almost 12% through
capital planning or the CCAR, and as high as 17% based on the critical
mass from Hill’s study.

102. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS
REVIEW 2015: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 15–18 (Mar., 2015). The Federal
Reserve has completed Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCARs”) every year since
2011. Results from year to year during that time are somewhat difficult to compare. This is because
the CCAR quantitative assessment focuses on a bank holding company’s ability to maintain required
minimum ratios during stress periods and the required minimum ratios have changed during this time
period. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEW 2014: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 10, Box 2 (Mar., 2014).
103. I have used the simple leverage ratio numbers for purposes of comparison rather than the
supplementary and enhanced supplementary leverage ratio discussed above. This is because neither
Hill’s study nor the CCAR provide data on the supplementary leverage ratios.
AND
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V. EVALUATING CAPITAL REGULATION
Part IV examined the nature of capital regulation with a particular
focus on the leverage ratio. That discussion combined both rulemaking
and supervisory elements of the regulatory process to illustrate the
bottom-up nature of capital regulation. This Part considers the
prominence of capital in the overall context of prudential regulation.
What are the benefits of capital regulation and are they sufficient to live
up to its important place in prudential regulation? In addition, this Part
considers the limitations of capital regulation.
Capital has emerged as the cornerstone of modern bank regulation
because study after study confirms that better capitalized banks perform
better during crises. 104 Studies by the Basel Committee and the United
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority support the benefits of higher
capital even when balanced against the costs (although, as discussed
below, true cost-benefit analysis may prove elusive). 105 In addition, the
leverage ratio has been shown to have countercyclical benefits because
104. Sebastien Gay & Balthazar D. Bergkamp, Does Basel Save Our Banks? The Effect of
I
Capital
Requirements
on
Bank
Failures
(2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629268
[https://perma.cc/5PMZ-BAKQ];
Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks
Perform Better?, 105 J. Fin. Econ. 1, 8–10 (2012); Allen Berger & Christa H.S. Bouwman, How Does
Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises?, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 146 (2013). An
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) study found that banks with higher and better-quality capital
were able to continue lending during the Financial Crisis. Tümer Kapan & Camelia Minoiu, Balance
Sheet Strength and Bank Lending During the Global Financial Crisis, (Int’l Monetary Fund IMF
Working Paper No.13/102 May 2012).
105. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LONG-TERM
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STRONGER CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS (Aug., 2010)
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf [https://perma.cc/45VF-TTSM]; Ray Barrell et al., Optimal
Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity (Fin. Services Authority Occasional Paper Series No. 38,
July 2009) http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op38.pdf [https://perma.cc/39ED-A88A].

Basel

SCHOONER CORRECT (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation

5/2/2016 12:19 PM

349

“it is a tighter constraint for banks in booms and a looser constraint in
recessions.” 106
Given the importance of capital to protecting banks in crisis,
positive regulation of bank capital serves all the various normative views
of bank regulation discussed in Part II. According to the functional
view, capital regulation serves the purpose of preserving the functioning
of banks that provide unique services to the economy. Under the
economist’s view of market failure, capital regulation serves as less
intrusive mechanism for reducing negative externalities than more
direct activities prohibitions like the Volcker rule. 107 While capital
regulation may create incentives to invest in certain types of assets, it
does not require banks to do so and thereby defers to management
discretion. 108 Naturally, capital regulation supports the view of banks as
government instrumentalities that should be operated safely to promote
the public interest.
Despite the manifold positive and normative claims supporting
capital regulation, it suffers from limitations. First and foremost is the
reality that the international regulation of capital, which began in the
1980s, did not prevent the devastating Financial Crisis in 2008. Using
this measure, capital regulation is a failure. And yet, the attacks on the
effectiveness of capital regulation boil down to a regulatory regime that
allowed banks to operate with far too little capital. The standard
criticism of the leverage ratio is that it does not distinguish between
types of assets. Yet if the minimum ratio is set sufficiently high, the
106. Michael Brei & Leonardo Gambacorta, The Leverage Ratio over the Cycle, (Bank of Int’l
Settlements Working Papers No. 471 Nov. 2014). The leverage ratio is also a good predictor of bank
failure. Arturo Estrella et al., Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure, 6 FRNY ECON. POL’Y
REV. 33 (July 2000).
107. Nothing herein is meant to suggest that regulating capital is effective on its own or, in
particular, that the leverage ratio is effective on its own. For example, financial instability can
emanate from short-term debt and capital regulation does not directly address that particular
problem (but, liquidity ratios do). See Gary B. Gorton, MISUNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012) (demonstrating that financial
crises begin with a run on short-term bank debt). Moreover, as discussed above in Part IV, the
leverage ratio when standing alone can create perverse risk incentives—the risk based capital ratio is
intended to counteract those incentives. Stefan Ingves, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Chairman, writes:
The leverage ratio, by placing an absolute cap on borrowings relative to a bank’s capital, is
an important component of the Basel III framework, and complements the risk-based
capital adequacy regime. But neither of these parts of the framework stands alone: it is
important to look at Basel III as a package of constraints that mutually reinforce prudent
behaviour.
Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Keynote Address to the 10th AsiaPacific High-Level Meeting on Banking Supervision: Banking on Leverage 5 (Feb. 2014),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp140226.pdf [ https://perma.cc/C7JA-HSAS].
108. Alan Greenspan writes, “Lawmakers and regulators, given elevated capital buffers, need to
be far less concerned about the quality of the banks’ loan and securities portfolios since any losses
would be absorbed by shareholders, not taxpayers.” Alan Greenspan, Opinion, More Capital is a
Less Painful Way to Fix the Banks, FIN. TIMES (August 17, 2015 5:24 p.m.),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4d55622a-44c8-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22.html#axzz3z8LZto9d
[https://perma.cc/95TS-892C].
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nature of the mix of assets held by the institution will be less important
to its solvency (in fact, that is the whole point of the leverage ratio).
The typical criticism of the risk-weighted capital ratio is that it attempts
to measure the riskiness of assets but does so poorly. But, again, this
type of error is much less important if the minimum required is not so
minimal.
We are left with a situation in which we know that more capital is
good but we do not know how much capital is enough. Quantifying
adequate capital is fraught with potential error. With regard to the
denominator of both the leverage ratio and the risk-weighted capital
ratio, potential errors are evident in valuing assets, determining their
risk weights, and corralling off-balance sheet exposures. With regard to
the numerator, while Basel III made significant improvements in
defining the nature of capital, significant issues remain with regard to
the loss absorbing nature of capital. 109 Perhaps most striking is the lack
of any principled basis for the current minimum capital rules. The Basel
Committee never demonstrated support for setting the original risk
based capital ratio at 8% and yet that number continues to serve as a
key reference point.
An obvious solution to the simultaneous importance and errorprone nature of capital regulation is to simply require more of it. A
growing number of authoritative commentators are urging just that. 110
Economists Admati and Hellwig argue for levels in the 20 to 30%
range. 111 In advance of rulemaking to implement Dodd-Frank, an
eminent group of economists and former policymakers wrote to urge
the Federal Reserve to adopt a leverage ratio of 20%. 112 Researchers at
the Bank of England and Bank of International Settlements, David
Miles, Jing Yang, and Gilberto Marcheggiano, suggest doubling the
109. Professor Arthur Wilmarth has criticized current Federal Reserve proposals regarding total
loss absorbing capital (which is intended to absorb losses in the event of a bank insolvency) because
such capital would likely be held by pensions and mutual funds, thus placing the loss of insolvency on
ordinary investors. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Fed’s TLAC Propose Would Impose the Cost of
Resolving Failed Megabanks on Ordinary Investors and Taxpayers, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec.
16, 2015) http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/12/16/the-feds-tlac-proposal-would-impose-thecosts-of-resolving-failed-megabanks-on-ordinary-investors-and-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/BXQ67L86].
110. Note that the variation in percentages among commentators is likely not really about
different levels of capital, but more about which ratio the particular commentator has chosen as the
basis for their proposal.
111. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 182 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2013).
112. Letter from Sheila Bair, Former Chairman of the FDIC, et al., to the Board of Governors of
the
Federal
Reserve
System
(Mar.
30,
2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/April/20120403/R-1438/R1438_033012_107166_399897884753_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JNX-UK93].
Specifically, they
recommend that large bank holding companies “should be required to have ratios of 20% of common
and preferred equity and subordinated debt to total (non-risk weighted) consolidated assets and 30%
of total equity and unsecured long-term debt to such assets.” Id.
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requirements set by Basel III.
Martin Wolf, chief economics
commentator for The Financial Times, recommends a leverage ratio of
at least 10% and “ideally more.” 113 Even former free-market-apologist,
Alan Greenspan favours capital at “20 or even 30 percent of assets.” 114
The objections to higher capital requirements focus on the resulting
increased cost to banks which in turn would increase the cost of credit.
This claim is controversial. 115 In addition, studies which attempt to
measure costs and benefits are far from perfect. Professor John Coates
challenges the conclusions of studies on the net benefits of capital and
other financial regulations because they all suffer from, among other
limitations, insufficient data, casual inference challenges, and reliance
on imperfect models. 116 Of course, the same objections apply to claims
that capital regulation generates a net cost. And yet, the key benefit of
capital remains uncontroversial: better capitalized banks are more
resilient in an economic downturn.
VI. TOP-DOWN CAPITAL REGULATION
Current capital regulation relies on a supervisory process of
estimating adequate capital for individual firms supported by bare
minimum, apply-to-all, rules that hang perilously close to the ground.
This places a heavy burden on the effectiveness of CCAR and agency
enforcement to ensure the safety of our financial system. Therefore, the
calls for significantly higher capital requirements discussed in Part V
come as no surprise. This Part makes no attempt to settle any debate
about whether, for example, the leverage ratio should be set at 20 or
30%. This Part does, however, support significantly higher minimum
capital requirements based on observations regarding current regulatory
practice.
As demonstrated in Part IV, the reality of capital regulation must
take into account both minimum ratios set by rule and the ratios
113. Martin Wolf, ‘Too Big to Fail’ is Too Big to Ignore, FIN. TIMES, April 15, 2014,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f755c450-c3c2-11e3-870b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3z8LZto9d
[https://perma.cc/UL6X-Y86R]. He goes on to say that at very least, “equity should be raised until all
measures of the subsidy are zero.” Id. In other words, suggesting that banks should be forced to
build their equity until they no longer benefit from any funding advantage based on government
subsidies.
114. Greenspan, supra note 108.
115. Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Would Stricter Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of
Capital?
Bank Capital Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233906
[https://perma.cc/V5ZT-B3DA];
Douglas Elliott et al., Assessing the Cost of Financial Regulation (Int’l Monetary Fund Working
Paper No. 12/233 Sept. 2012).
116. John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 997 (2015); but see Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, The Case for
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations, REG. Mag. 30 (Winter 2013-2014) (arguing in favor
of cost-benefit analysis and using capital regulation as a running example).
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imposed through the exercise of supervisory discretion. Taken together,
the current regime is a bottom-up approach to capital regulation in
which rule-based minimum ratios are applied to all institutions and
higher requirements are imposed on a firm-by-firm basis through
various supervisory mechanisms. This bottom-up approach speaks
volumes regarding minimum capital rules. Minimum ratios are truly,
barely minimum. They do not serve as a benchmark for adequate
capital but, instead, perhaps serve only at the rock bottom starting point
for the supervisory process by which capital levels are ultimately set. 117
So-called “dynamic capital supervision” 118 like CCAR responds to
the deficiencies of minimum ratios which have been shown time and
again to serve as lagging indicators of financial trouble within a financial
institution. 119
Yet, reliance on the supervisory process to set
appropriate capital level when the minimum rules are inadequate places
all of the risk of error at the feet of the regulatory agencies—thus,
ultimately, the public. This is because if the CCAR process does not
reliably serve to prepare institutions for the economic bust, government
subsidies (either explicit or implicit) will be tapped to protect such
institutions, and the public will suffer from greater damage to the
economy. 120
In evaluating the current bottom-up approach to capital regulation,
it is useful to consider the types of error that regulators might make in
either setting minimum ratios or exercising their supervisory discretion.
Since regulators are attempting to identify weak banks through capital
regulation, a false positive (type one error) would occur if the bank
regulator thought a bank was undercapitalized when it was not. On the
other hand, a false negative (type two error) would occur if the bank
regulator thought a bank was adequately capitalized and it actually was
not. The risks associated with the false negative should be, and are, the
primary concern of a bank regulator, and the current system seems ill
suited to avoid that type of error. Moreover, the false positive should
not be ignored to the extent that there remains controversy over the
costs of capital.

117. Hill asserts that, “[s]tatements from bank regulators show that they believe the minimum
capital ratios established by regulation are insufficient.” Hill supra note 88, at 700. Of course, Hill’s
study was conducted prior to the implementation of new, Basel III and Dodd-Frank capital ratios.
118. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Developing Tools for Dynamic Capital Supervision, BOARD OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RES.
SYS.
(April
10,
2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120410a.htm
[https://perma.cc/ADV8V8N4].
119. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
120. And, while it is true that this is largely a concern with regard to very large institutions and
their persistent status as too big to fail, we must not forget that small banks are also important to our
economy and have access to government subsidies. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Angels, 50
GA. L. REV. 143 (2015).
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The potential risks of both types of error could be more sensibly
addressed by flipping the current practice from a bottom-up to a topdown system of capital regulation. In a top-down system, capital ratios
applying to all banks would be set high—high enough so that the risk of
a false negative is very small. 121 The risk of a false positive would be
addressed through a supervisory process, in which banks could be
permitted, on a firm-by-firm basis, to operate below capital levels set by
rule. The move from the bottom-up to the top-down regime is
illustrated below in Figure 2.

Flipping the supervisory and rulemaking process requires further
exploration. Consider a hypothetical, very large bank called MegaBank.
If the leverage ratio is set at 20%, then MegaBank would be required to
comply with that ratio. Under the top-down scenario, the CCAR
process could be used to establish that MegaBank needs only, say, 11%
to survive an adverse or severely adverse scenario. Such a simple flip
would leave us with virtually the same system as the current one in
which the risk of error in allowing that bank to operate with an 11%
ratio would be borne by the public (via regulator error). The problem
121. See supra Part V (discussing proposals for high capital ratios).
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ultimately is that the system does not place the risk of loss on those who
are in the best position to avoid the risk—bank management. As
discussed in Part IV, bank managers are ultimately responsible for
capital adequacy and appropriately so given their superior knowledge of
their firms’ operations and risk management. Thus, the top-down
system would access that superior knowledge and provide incentives to
avoid error by relying on bank managers to determine appropriate
capital adequacy levels. In this way, if MegaBank wished to operate at a
leverage ratio lower than required under applicable rules (which now
serve as a safe harbor), MegaBank’s management could apply
regulators for exemption from the rules. Such an application would
require management to certify that MegaBank could operate safely at
lower levels of capital. To create appropriate incentives for a
meaningful application (as opposed to a pro forma statement that lower
capital is adequate), such application would serve as the basis for
personal liability (including appropriate fines and other penalties)
against managers if their assertions regarding capital adequacy proved
wrong (a false negative).
The exact parameters of the personal liability of management are
beyond the scope of this Article and could be the subject of further
study. The basis for such individual liability exists in the current
administrative enforcement regime. 122 If, for example, executive
management of Megabank applied to the Federal Reserve for the
authority to operate below safe harbor rules, they would be required to
assert that the bank’s solvency would not be at risk. If assertions in that
application proved false, the Federal Reserve’s administrative
enforcement powers would be triggered so that, for example, the
Federal Reserve could impose a cease and desist order on the bank and
its managers, including an order of restitution, reimbursement, or
indemnification. 123
And yet, existing administrative enforcement authority often
requires a showing of personal gain or culpability which would
undermine the usefulness of such recourse. 124 Therefore, the top-down
capital regulation proposal is most complemented by those who argue in
favor of greater personal liability for bank managers. 125 Often such
122. See supra Part III (discussing administrative enforcement powers).
123. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2012) provides for cease and desist authority “in connection with any
action on any application, notice, or other request . . . by the institution-affiliated party . . . .”
124. For example, agency cease and desist authority included the ability to seek restitution
against bank managers but only of such party was “unjustly enriched in connection with such
violation or practice,” Id. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i),or if “the violation or practice involved reckless
disregard for the law . . . .” Id. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i)–(ii).
125. Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections, supra note 16 (arguing that [systematically important
financial institution] managers should have a “public governance duty”); Lyman Johnson, Corporate
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. L.J. 865 (2005); Donald Langevoort, On Leaving
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proposals harken back to the days when Wall Street banks were formed
as partnerships and the partners enjoyed none of the liability
protections afforded corporate shareholders and, ultimately,
managers. 126 Professors Claire Hill and Richard Painter offer a
thoughtful exploration of a system of strict liability for certain bank
managers in the event of insolvency. 127 High capital ratios that allow for
managers to apply for authority to operate at lower levels of capital
would work well within such a system of personal accountability.
The top-down system benefits bank management since it depends
on the determination of a leverage (or other) ratio set high enough that
it acts as a safe harbor. As such, banks and bank managers would not
be subject to liability if the bank met the ratio. Under the current
system, banks cannot be sure that meeting minimum rules is adequate
and, as discussed, very often it is not. Under the top-down system, the
regulatory ratios would have more meaning in that management could
rely on achieving compliance at that level. On the other hand, managers
with the confidence that their bank can be safely operated at lower
levels of capital would be given the flexibility to do so. Appropriately,
the risk of error in such situations would be borne by management,
through personal liability, which would assure that such an important
determination was made with deliberation and appropriate confidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
Better capitalized banks are more sustainable during financial
crises. Therefore, the regulation of bank capital is an essential element
in efforts to reduce the threat of systemic crisis. The current system,
however, does not properly account for the risk of error in determining
appropriate levels of capital. The proposed system of top-down capital
regulation is a superior approach which balances the benefits of
mandating precautionary levels of capital against the informed wisdom
of bank management in determining the viability of safe operations at
lower levels of capital. In this way, capital regulation is better positioned
to deliver on its promise of safer banks and a more resilient financial
system.

Corporate Executives Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies
and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007).
126. William D. Cohan, How We Got the Crash Wrong, THE ATLANTIC, June 2012, (“[t]o

prevent another crisis, Wall Street’s top executives, bankers, and traders should once again have
something close to their full net worth on the line every day . . . .”).
127. CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS:
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 149–171 (2015).

